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The Penal Ombudsman: A Step
Toward Penal Reform
Recent disturbances in prisons across the nation have focused
attention on our prison population. Many argue that prison riots
are initiated by "malcontents," "troublemakers," and "revolution-
aries" inside and outside the prison. Others have attributed the
disturbances to prisoner frustration with the complaint procedures
in the prisons. Assembly Bill 1181, introduced in the 1971
California Legislature, would have created a prison ombudsman
for the state prison system. The bill was vetoed by the Governor.
This comment discusses the types of complaints made by prisoners,
the present remedies for handling these complaints, and the purpose
and function of an ombudsman. The penal ombudsman as pro-
posed by A.B. 1181 is then considered by the author and some
suggestions are made which may improve the bill if it is re-intro-
duced.
The system of justice must be viewed as a process embracing
every phase from crime prevention at the beginning through arrest,
trial and the correctional system. We can no longer limit our re-
sponsibility to providing defense services for the judicial process
alone and yet continue to be miserly with the needs of correc-
tional-institution, probation and parole systems.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger*
Recent public outcry, sparked by a series of violent events begin-
ning with the killing of three black inmates by a white guard in Janu-
ary, 1970 and continuing with the killing of George Jackson, a "Sole-
dad Brother," has focused attention on California's penal system,'
with the result that the system is facing its first major changes since
* State of the Federal Judiciary Address, August 10, 1970.
1. See, e.g., Black Caucus Report, Treatment of Prisoners at California Training
Facility at Soledad Central, July, 1970; TIME, January 18, 1971, at 48; Mitford, Kind
and Usual Punishment in California, THE ArLANTIC, March, 1971, at 45; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 7, 1971 at 64, cols. 1-8. A series of newspaper articles dealing with the
California Penal system appearing in the Sacramento Bee, the San Francisco Chronicle
and the Los Angeles Times have been collected by Senator Mervyn Dymally's office
in a memorandum entitled "Prisons-A California Crisis." This memo is available
through Senator Dymally's office.
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1944.2 Lawsuits have been initiated to enforce the civil rights of pris-
oners,3 neighborhood organizations have been formed to bring pres-
sure for penal reform4 and there has been widespread press coverage
of events in the prison system. 5
These pressures have already brought changes within the system.
The Director of the Department of Corrections has ordered an extensive
revision of the rules and regulations for the administration of Califor-
nia state prisons. 6 Several persons in the Central Office of the De,
partment of Corrections have been assigned to categorize and tabulate
all complaints and inquiries received.' Consideration is being given to
appointing an agent of the Central Office to investigate all complaints
received in that office."
Pressure for further changes is being exerted in the California Legis-
lature. Senator Dymally introduced a bill to form a California Con-
mission of Prison Reform.9 Numerous other bills were introduced
dealing with specific reforms.'" As a result of hearings on the desira-
bility of a correctional ombudsman held on December 14 and 15, 1970
before the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure, As-
sembly Bill 1181, which would establish an ombudsman for the state
prisons system, was introduced on March 25, 1971."1
What is an ombudsman? Traditionally, he is "an independent and
impartial person . . . who investigates citizens' complaints of bureau-
cratic abuse and monitors the quality of administrative justice."' 2
Is such a person needed in the California prison system? The answer
to this question depends on the adequacy of a prisoner's remedies
for mistreatment in prison.
2. The current system was organized in 1944 after several years of intense
political battle, during which the Governor removed the State Board of Prison
Directors for misconduct. See L. VoIGT, HISTORY OF CALn oRNIA STATE CORECTIoNAL
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1930 To 1948, 12-18 (1949).
3. Mitford, supra note 1, at 51; Sacramento Bee, Feb. 7, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
4. Sacramento Bee, Feb. 7, 1971, at 4, col. 3. Examples of such organizations
are: Seventh Step, the California Prisoners Union, the Black Culture Association, Con-
nections, and the American Society of Friends.
5. See note 1 supra.
6. Interview with Philip D. Guthrie, Information Officer for the Department of
Corrections, in Sacramento, California, Feb. 4, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Guthrie].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. S.B. 323, 1971 Regular Session, as amended, March 23, 1971.
10. For a sampling of the bills introduced at the 1971 Regular Session, See
Assembly Bills 1140, 2090, 2515, 2699, 2904, 2968; ACR 123; Senate Bills 1273, 1275
and 1610.
11. Hearings on the Desirability of a Correctional Ombudsman, before the
Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure, Dec. 14 and 15, 1970 [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
12. Report on the Penal Ombudsman, by the California Assembly Interim Com-
mittee on Criminal Procedure, March 25, 1971, p. 7.
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THE NEED FOR A PENAL OMBUDSMAN IN CALIFORNIA
The types of problems most frequently complained of by prisoners
will be examined first, followed by an analysis of existing remedies and
their adequacy. The following categorization of prisoner-related com-
plaints is based on the statistical categorization made by the Central
Office of the Department of Corrections for the month of January,
1971.13 The categories are ranked in order of decreasing volume.
Examples of the types of problems were drawn from the files of pris-
oner complaints kept by various legislators, and from personal inter-
views with ex-convicts and parolees. 14  All examples are recent. It
must be remembered that all complaints mentioned are merely alle-
gations and do not necessarily reflect any facts other than the fact that
prisoners have complaints.
Parole Complaints-This was the largest category with 89 complaints.
Under the indeterminate sentence law,15 the Adult Authority may re-
fuse to grant parole if it feels that the prisoner is not rehabilitated
or it may revoke parole once granted.'0 Since the indeterminate
sentence procedure was begun, California prison terms have increased
until they are the highest in the country, and possibly in the world.17
Most complaints in this category evince strong prisoner suspicion of
the motives of the Adult Authority. In one case, the Adult Authority
replied to a legislator's inquiry about a parole denial by saying, "This
inmate's poor juvenile record indicates severe behavioral problems. It
can be expected that changing his attitudes and habits will take a long
time." The man claimed that his record had been exemplary during
the four years he had served for robbery.'"
Transfer and Classification-77 complaints. An inmate may wish a
transfer to another institution for a variety of reasons. He may want to
be closer to his family, he might want vocational training offered at
the other institution, the other institution may be more comfortable, or
he may be having difficulty with the administrators of his institution.
He may request transfer to one institution and yet be transferred to
another which is unsatisfactory. One man requested transfer to an-
other minimum security institution, for which he was qualified, so he
13. Department of Corrections memorandum entitled "Monthly Summary of com-
plaint letters received from inmates to Central Office for the month of January, 1971."
14. Unless otherwise noted, examples are not based on information from the
Department of Corrections. Strict confidentiality regarding the names of prisoners
and parolees, and of the legislators who so graciously allowed perusal of their
files must be maintained.
15. CAL. PEN. CODE §1168.
16. CAL. PEN. CODE §5077.
17. Mitford, supra note 1, at 47; TIME, supra note 1, at 50.
18. From a legislator's file.
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could take advantage of a vocational training program there, but was
instead transferred to the maximum security facility at San Quentin.
He claimed he was being punished for attempting to form a Mexican-
American cultural group.19
When a prisoner enters prison, he is classified according to the type
of crime he committed, his vocational aptitude and psychiatric evalua-
tions. 20 This classification determines the type of work he will do, the
surroundings he will live in and his relative freedom. Many prisoners
claim that the Classification Committee disregards individual tal-
ents and problems, and instead bases its decision on "institutional con-
venience" where the beds are and where the work is needed.2'
Legal-73 complaints. Many of these are claims of wrongful convic-
tion, denial of a writ, new evidence proving innocence of the crime for
which they were committed-the "I want out" complaint.22  These
claims would be outside of a penal ombudsman's jurisdiction. Some
complaints, however, relate to interference with legal correspondence or
denial of access to hearing files, which could be within the ombuds-
man's jurisdiction.
Medical-30 complaints. An inmate may need a delicate operation
and not trust the staff, or he may feel that he is getting too much, too
little or the wrong kind of treatment. One inmate at Folsom lost two sets
of dentures in a short time and claimed that delay in delivery of the
third set was punishment.23  Another man suffered from blackouts
and dizziness, and complained that he was simply given tranquilizers
for nine months before being sent out for proper treatment.24
Program Treatment-29 complaints. Most complaints about discipli-
nary actions are included in this category, since revocation of the priv-
ilege of engaging in various programs is a common form of punish-
ment.25 An inmate's "privilege card" allows him to use the canteen or
see a movie; this card is often revoked in a disciplinary action.2 6
Prison disciplinary hearings may result from violation of many pris-
on rules which are hard to categorize. In one letter, an inmate alleged
that he took no silverware at a meal, not needing it. Although he no-
tified one guard, another insisted upon searching him when he failed
to turn in silver after the meal. He protested the search made of his
19. Guthrie.
20. Id.
21. The author's personal interviews with parolees and ex-convicts elicited these
complaints.
22. Guthrie.
23. Id.
24. From a legislator's file.
25. Guthrie.
26. Id.
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person and his cell. He claimed he was disciplined for taking the silver,
for having his hair too long, for disrespect, and for having contraband
in his cell (several Life magazines he was not authorized to receive). " '
Complaints about working conditions also fall in this category.
Religion and Race-23 complaints. Many prisoners profess themselves
"political prisoners" of a racist society. Many ordinarily innocuous
grievances are perceived as racial slurs. Members of all races com-
plain of racial insults from guards or other prisoners. In one case,
a Mexican-American organization planned to show a movie on Mexi-
can-American culture and requested permission to use the dining hall,
the only facility large enough to accommodate a crowd. Word got
around among the inmates that entry would be allowed to anyone who
signed up on the group's guest list, and many did. When permission
to show the film was denied, it was interpreted as a racial insult, al-
though there may have been valid administrative reasons. 28  Religious
complaints, such as those from Black Muslims, are also included here.
Property-17 complaints. This includes stealing by other inmates
and confiscation of what is deemed "contraband" by the administra-
tion. A chapstick whose center is pulled out might be contraband since
it could be used to conceal narcotics. Possession of such items could
result in a "115"--a disciplinary "write-up"-which could in turn re-
sult in denial of parole for another year.29 Also included in this cate-
gory is destruction of an inmate's property by another inmate. In one
case, a prisoner complained that his neighbor, angry because of a dis-
pute over a television set, threw hot water over his recently purchased
law books."
Mail and Visits-15 complaints. There are many complaints that
mail sent out never reaches its destination, even though certain kinds
of mail are not supposed to be censored or inspected.31 Each prisoner
is allowed to correspond regularly with ten persons, who must be on
his correspondence list.32 Getting someone on or off the list can be a
long and complicated process. 3 There were some complaints of ex-
cessively thorough searches of inmates after visits.3 4
Staff-6 complaints. This category refers to physical and psycholog-
ical mistreatment or harassment by the prison staff. Popular litera-
27. From a legislator's file.
28. From a legislator's file.
29. Guthrie.
30. From a legislator's file.
31. Rules and Regulations of the Director of the Department of Corrections,
D2402(10) (1970).
32. Id. at D2403.
33. Personal interviews with parolees and ex-convicts.
34. Such a search apparently triggered off the riot at San Quentin Prison leading to
George Jackson's death. Sacramento Bee, Aug. 23, 1971 at 1, col. 5.
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ture is replete with examples, although this type of overt abuse is
probably rare in California today.35
Protection-1 complaint. This was a request for protection from ei-
ther a member of the staff, or from other inmates. An inmate who
feels his life or safety is in danger may request solitary confinement,
and occasionally does so when an unwritten law is broken (such as
nonpayment of gambling debts).
Uncategorized by the Department of Corrections were civil legal
complaints, such as the man who complained that his wife was spend-
ing the welfare check on drink and another man, to the neglect of the
children. 6 At least one study has indicated that these problems are
much more prevalent than the Department of Corrections statistics
would indicate.37
The above allegations may be wild fabrications or they may show
only the tip of the iceberg; without full investigatory powers of subpoena
vested in a disinterested third party it is impossible to tell. It seems
reasonable to assume, however, that without fear of real or imag-
ined retaliation by the staff the volume and variety of prisoner com-
plaints would increase.38
EXIsTING PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER COMPLAINTS
Administrative Remedies
An inmate may complain to one of the administrative officers
within his institution; the complaint might vary from a simple gripe
to a guard to a formal plea to the warden. Although this might help
in a minor matter or where the evidence was very clear, ex-convicts
and parolees mistrust this procedure.3 9  "Who is going to take my
word over a guard's" was a common query. One inmate claimed
to another interviewer that a disciplinary committee would never
find an inmate innocent of a disciplinary infraction "because it would
mean taking the word of a convict over that of a guard. But if they
really do believe you are innocent, they'll find you guilty and let you
off with a reprimand."4
35. For a sensational example of this complaint, see Sacramento Bee, Aug. 22,
1971, at 1, col. 1. After George Jackson's death many prisoners complained of beat-
ings, but when the prison gates were opened to attorneys, legislators and the news
media, little evidence of beatings was found. Sacramento Bee, Aug. 28, 1971, at 3,
col. 1.
36. From a legislator's files.
37. Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoner's Rights,
53 IowA L. REv. 671 (1967).
38. Personal interviews with ex-convicts and parolees suggested this conclusion.
39. All ex-convicts and parolees interviewed were unanimous on this point.
40. Mitford, supra note 1, at 48. Personal interviews with ex-convicts and pa-
rolees revealed this same attitude.
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A more common avenue of complaint open to the inmate is to one
of the institutional social workers, such as a chaplain, a psychiatrist or
a counsellor. 1 This person may then intercede on the prisoner's behalf
with the proper administrative official. This procedure is inadequate
since the inmate must first find someone who is sympathetic to his
problem and even then his intercessor has no real investigatory or re-
medial powers.
If the inmate receives no satisfaction within the institution he may
complain to the Central Office of the Department of Corrections.
This office generally reacts in one of two ways: in certain very sensi-
tive areas (usually racial complaints or complaints against the staff) a
thorough investigation is carried out by the Central Office, and a recom-
mendation is made to the Director of Corrections or to the head of the
institution; if the complaint is not in a particularly sensitive area, as
most are not,42 it is simply referred back to the appropriate official
within the institution, with the recommendation that the complaint
be investigated. 43  On these matters, no formal follow-up and little
or no investigation is made by the Central Office itself.4
Again, this procedure could be considered inadequate. Unless the
complaint falls within an especially sensitive area it is merely referred
back to the institution without a thorough investigation, and adminis-
trative remedies within the institution must be relied on. Most ex-con-
victs and parolees interviewed felt that this procedure provided in-
adequate or illusory relief.
If the inmate feels that he has not received justice from the prison
authorities, he may write to the outside world. His family is sometimes
able to intercede on his behalf, and private agencies, such as the
American Friends Society, conduct regular programs of assistance for
prisoners. 45 If the inmate can afford to hire an attorney who is willing
to help, he may turn in this direction. Since many inmates were de-
fended at their trial by a public defender, complaints often are di-
rected to his office. However, most prisoner complaints are outside
the public defender's jurisdiction since they are not "legal" complaints.
An inmate may write an -uncensored letter to a legislator. But leg-
islators are very busy persons: they lack firm information, are unable
to give legal advice and are unwilling to use personal influence ex-
41. Guthrie; Testimony of the Director of the Department of Corrections, Hear-
ings, at 33-46.
42. Of the 380 complaints received by the Central Office in January, 1971, only
29 concerned staff, religion or race. See note 13 supra.
43. Guthrie.
44. Id.
45. Hearings, at 133.
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cept in extreme cases.46 Complaints are usually referred back to the
Department of Corrections or to the Adult Authority.47 Letters to the
Governor meet the same fate. 48
These complaints to the outside are often ineffective. A family, a
private agency, a personal attorney and individual legislators lack the
power to require an investigation, and without information they can
only rely on their personal influence over prison officials. These ave-
nues of complaint are fragmented; a prisoner must become relatively
sophisticated in prison life before he discovers them all. They are
also time-consuming; it may be weeks or months before a matter is
acted upon and thus these procedures are useful only for standing
grievances. A prisoner often despairs before exhausting administra-
tive remedies.
Judicial remedies4 9
A prisoner who wishes to seek judicial review of disciplinary ac-
tion must first gain access to the courts. Although incarceration re-
suits in the limitation of many privileges,50 including the right to use
the mails,5 ' prisoners must be allowed to petition the courts.52 Thus
access to the courts would seem to be guaranteed. But this basic
right of communication with the courts can be severely qualified by
restrictions on the ability to prepare adequately. Most members of the
legal profession would agree that the assistance of an attorney is
vital to the preparation of a successful court petition, yet courts are reluc-
tant to appoint attorneys,53 and most prisoners cannot afford counsel.
The result is that an inmate will either attempt to develop writ-writ-
ing skills on his own, or will turn to another inmate who will do it for
him. 4 In either case, the writ is generally of poor quality because
46. Report on the Penal Ombudsman, supra note 12, at 19-20; Guthrie.
47. Id.
48. Telephone interview with Richard K. Turner, Assistant Legal Affairs Secre-
tary, Governor's Office, in Sacramento, California, Feb. 16, 1971.
49. For a review of this area, see Gallington, Prison Disciplinary Decisions, 60
J. Cirm. L. 152 (1969); see also Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the
Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REv. 669 (1966).
50. "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948); see also
CAL. PEN. CoDE § 2600.
51. In re Allison, 66 Cal. 2d 282, 288, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 876 (1967); CAL.
PEN. CODE §§2600, 5058; Rules and Regulations of the Director of the Department
of Corrections, D2401, D2404, D2605 (1967).
52. In re Allison, 66 Cal. 2d 282, 288 (1967).
53. The reason for this reluctance is a fear that prisoners would abuse any such
right by demanding counsel in hopes of "inventing allegations that would meet the
requirements of law." Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 436 (D. Md. 1966).
54. For an excellent trilogy of essays dealing with prison writ-writing, present-
ing the views of a prisoner experienced in writ-writing, a prison librarian and an attor-
ney involved in this area, see Larsen, Spector and Krause, Prison Writ-Writing: Three
Essays, 56 CAL F. L. REv. 342 (1968).
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inmates view their cases subjectively. Many prisoners are illiterate
and few literate prisoners have the legal education to prepare a good
writ. Finally, prison legal source materials are grossly inadequate."5
Some of the effects of these restrictions on the ability to prepare ade-
quately are mitigated by a "liberal pleading rule," allowing liberal
construction of communications from prisoners.56 But no amount of
liberal construction can help the prisoner who is unaware of his legal
remedies because he lacks funds to hire counsel and who himself has
insufficient legal knowledge. While prisoners are notoriously well-
informed of criminal procedures, they are often woefully ignorant of
their civil legal remedies.17
Assuming a prisoner gets over these initial obstacles and gains ac-
cess to a court, he must persuade the court to exercise its discretion
and review his case. The courts have been reluctant to interfere with
prison administration and generally refuse to hear complaints, 8 argu-
ing that authority to administer the prison system is delegated by
statute to the executive branch of the government 9 along with broad
discretionary rule-making power.60
There are, however, exceptions to this "hands-off" policy in ex-
treme cases. 61 These are defined as cases "alleging deprivations of
constitutionally and legally protected rights.""2 In explaining this defi-
nition the court in Roberts v. Pepersack6 3 said
The role of the Federal Courts in articulating the rights of
prisoners is a difficult one. The courts have approached this
problem by first recognizing the rights afforded all citizens un-
der the Constitution, and then, in dealing specifically with rights
of prisoners, removing some of these rights completely and others
to a limited extent.6 '
55. Id. at 351-354.
56. Long v. Katzenbach, 258 F. Supp. 89, 91 (M.D. Pa. 1966); In re Allison,
66 Cal. 2d 282 (1967). The court in Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 436
(D. Md. 1966) framed the plaintiff's allegations in the manner most beneficial to him
by interpreting and rephrasing the allegations. In In re Gonsalves, 48 Cal. 2d 638,
643 (1957), the court treated an informal letter addressed to the court as an adequate
notice of appeal.
57. See Comment, Resolving Civil Problems of Correctional Inmates, 1969 Wisc.
L. REv. 574 (1969).
58. Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, rehearing 194 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied 344 U.S. 822 (1952). The "hands off" doctrine is reviewed in Gallington,
supra note 49.
59. CAL. PEN. CODE §5054.
60. CAL. PEN. CODE §5058.
61. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 932 (1964).
62. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
932 (1964).
63. 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Pa. 1966).
64. Id. at 327. This attitude of Federal Courts is typical of California courts.
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The court went on to hold that first amendment freedoms do not protect
a protest of the prison regimen by means of a sit-down demonstration.
With respect to punishment, the court in Roberts cited a case65 in
which the plaintiff-prisoners alleged deprivation of food, water and
toilet paper for a period of fifty-two hours and were denied relief. The
allegations in Roberts-forced to lie naked on a cold concrete floor
in a temperature of 400 for twenty-six hours-were held insufficient.
Thus courts will refuse to hear a prisoner's complaint unless an extreme
case involving a deprivation of constitutional rights (themselves much
more severely limited than the ordinary citizen's) is alleged.
If a prisoner convinces a federal court that his case involves such
a deprivation of constitutional rights, he has two remedies. Federal
habeas corpus, although not ordinarily available to review a prison dis-
ciplinary action imposed on a legally incarcerated prisoner,66 is
available where solitary confinement is imposed 67 under the reasoning
that solitary confinement is a "jail within a jail. '68
If the prisoner's case is an extreme one involving deprivation of
constitutional rights but not solitary confinement, he may bring suit 69
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.70 This is the most often
used remedy by state prisoners in federal courts.71 But the Act pro-
tects only those rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, such
as cruel and unusual punishment while in prison72 or denial of equal
protection of the laws. 73  And the court in Roberts v. Pepersack
emphasized that
The importance of vindicating these violations, however, must
be tempered by a reluctance to subject police officers and
other officials to fear of reprisals for their activities. 74
It appears from this brief review that federal judicial remedies are
available only where solitary confinement is imposed or where the
case is an extreme one involving a deprivation of constitutional rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 75  It would be difficult
to argue that many of the complaints of California prisoners, as earlier
categorized, fall within this language. It appears that relief in a fed-
eral court is inadequate for most prisoners' complaints.
65. See In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852 (1962). 256 F. Supp. 415, 430 (D.
Pa. 1966). The case is Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 291 (D. Colo. 1962).
66. Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548, 549 (4th Cir. 1963).
67. Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
68. Id. at 787.
69. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 425 (D. Pa. 1966).
70. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1871).
71. Gallington, supra note 49, at 160; Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415,
421 (D. Pa. 1966).
72. Jacobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
73. Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).
74. 256 F. Supp. 415, 423 (D. Pa. 1966).
75. See text at notes 62-68, supra.
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Relief in California State Courts
In California, the writ of habeas corpus has come to occupy a unique
position.76 Although originally designed to secure release of one il-
legally confined,7 7 a relatively recent line of decisions has expanded
the writ to give it characteristics of declaratory relief. s  Today tie
California writ of habeas corpus "may be sought by one lawfully in
custody for the purpose of vindicating rights to which he is en-
titled, even in confinement."79  This use of the extraordinary writ has
been used primarily to review denial of access to the courts or to coun-
sel,80 or to compel transfer of a prisoner to another jurisdiction to
allow concurrent serving of sentences.8 ' There is dicta to the effect that
the writ may be used to secure relief from any invasion of a pris-
oner's rights.8 2 However, this writer was able to find few California
cases in which allegations of racial and religious discrimination and of
cruel and inhuman punishment were actually reviewed,sa and no cases
where relief was afforded.
Court review in California as a means of handling prisoners'
complaints suffers from several disadvantages. The most obvious is that
writ-writing requires a certain degree of legal sophistication not pos-
sessed by most prisoners.8 4  The result is that a prisoner who is un-
able to afford counsel must have long experience in writ-writing be-
fore he can hope to be successful,8" which in turn results in a flood of
writs, most of which are frivolous.8 6  A second major disadvantage
to review by habeas corpus is that denial of the writ is not appealable
by the prisoner.8 7  This means that the inexperienced writ-writer is
given only one chance, and as he later becomes more sophisticated, he
is encouraged to fabricate new allegations to sustain a writ.8  Finally,
it should be pointed out that the relief afforded by this use of habeas
corpus is prospective only; no damages may be recovered as under
the Civil Rights Act.
76. WrIN, CALIFORNIA CRIINAL PROCEDURE, §789 (1963).
77. CAL. PEN. CODE §§1473, 1487.
78. See WrrrmN, CALIFORN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §789 (1963).
79. In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 851 (1962). In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675,
682 (1970).
80. See, e.g., In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1 (1955).
81. See, e.g., In re Patterson, 64 Cal. 2d 357 (1966).
82. E.g., In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848 (1962).
83. In re Jones, 57 Cal. 2d 860 (1962); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663 (1961).
84. See generally, Larsen, Spector and Krause, supra note 54.
85. Id.
86. The number of federal habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners has in-
creased from 814 in 1957 to 4,845 in 1965, more than 95% of which were frivolous.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3663-3664 (1966).
87. CAL. PEN. CODE §1506. People v. Lempia, 144 Cal. App. 2d 393, cerl.
denied 353 U.S. 916 and 353 U.S. 967 (1956).
88. See generally, Larsen, Spector and Krause, supra note 54.
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At least one of these disadvantages can be overcome by filing a writ
of mandamus, since denial of that writ is appealable.89 However, the
writ itself is much narrower than habeas corpus, and will generally lie
only if an official refuses to perform a ministerial duty, or if there is
an abuse of discretion.90 Since the area of discretion delegated to pris-
on authorities is so broad9 1 the writ has been only infrequently
used to protect civil rights.
If the prisoner's complaint is one of physical abuse by guards he
can initate a tort action against the public entity and its employee.9 2
But even though the Tort Claims Act of 1963 provides governmental
liability as a general rule,93 most prisoner claims are excluded by Gov-
ernment Code Section 844.6. Only on rare occasions may a prisoner
sue the state.9 4
In summary, existing administrative and judicial remedies often fail
to provide relief for the majority of complaints by prisoners. If the
problem concerns continued isolation in solitary confinement or a se-
vere beating the sophisticated prisoner can probably obtain relief by
appealing to the Central Office of the Department of Corrections or
to the courts. But if the problem concerns a relatively minor disci-
plinary action or administrative decision, the prisoner probably has
no recourse outside his own institution.95 And even if outside help is
available, it is likely to be time-consuming and costly. The only other
remedy is court review which is a burdensome and costly method for
processing most types of complaints. The need, then, is for some
quick informal review of these lesser problems by an impartial "out-
sider". This is a classic situation where the ombudsman functions most
effectively.
THE OMBUDSMAN
As domains have grown larger, and the tasks of governing more
complex, rulers have been increasingly forced to delegate broad
89. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §963.
90. See generally, WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMAL PROCEDURE § 783 (1963).
91. CAL. PEN. CODE §5058.
92. See Comment, The Sovereign Should Be Liable for the Wrongful Injury of
Prisoners, 2 PAC. L.J 697 (1971).
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE §815.2.
94. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§844.6, 845.4, 845.6.
95. Dr. David Fogel, a criminologist and consultant to the National College of
State Trial Judges, has said:
When one considers that incarceration means the regulation of the smallest
phases of a prisoner's life-freedom of movement, of expression, of religious
freedom, of sexual relations, of security of person, property, goods, and serv-
ices, of effective remedial safeguards-one can readily appreciate the impor-
tance of the lack of judicial review.
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responsibility for administration. 6 To see that their policies were ef-
fectively carried out, rulers long ago conceived of establishing inde-
pendent institutions to investigate and report on administrative activi-
ties. 9 7  One form of an independent governmental investigator is the
ombudsman.98
The office of the ombudsman became internationally recognized
after the Second World War, and similar institutions may now be found
in Finland, 99 Denmark,1 00 New Zealand,101 Norway0 2 and three prov-
inces in Canada.10 3 In the United States, the Army, since 1777, has had
the Inspector General, who is the working equivalent of a military
ombudsman; 104 Hawaii created a civil ombudsman in 1967.10r This
rapid spread of the institution has been ascribed to a growing recogni-
tion that "power has to be used subtly, and the ombudsman is the
ultimate in the subtle use of power."' 0 6
The ombudsman is an official who investigates complaints about
government administration.lo'r An examination of the various modern
ombudsmen will reveal the following characteristics of the office: the
ombudsman must be independent of the agencies he investigates; he
must be given full powers of investigation; and he may recommend
action and publicize his recommendation, but he may not take direct
action to correct any shortcomings.10 8
How is the ombudsman selected? The character of the man se-
lected is probably the critical factor in determining the success of
the office.'0 9 The ombudsman must remain impartial and avoid parti-
96. W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 1-4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
GELLHORN]. This is the classic work on ombudsmen; much of the material was first
printed in various legal periodicals.
97. Forerunners of the modem ombudsman may be found in Chinese, Roman
and Russian history. The direct progenitor of the modem ombudsman was the Chan-
cellor of Justice appointed by Swedish King Charles XII in 1713 to keep an eye on
royal officials while he was away fighting on the vast Russian plains. This official
remained under the king's control, except for a brief period, until the Swedish consti-
tution of 1809 was promulgated. This document created the Justitieombudsman, who
was directly responsible to the Parliament. See generally, Pai-Chuan Tao, The Chinese
Ombudsman and Control System, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 362 (1967); GELLHORN, at
194-195, 336-371; Jagerskiold, The Swedish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1077-
1079 (1961).
98. GELLHORN, at 1-4.
99. GELLHORN, at 49-50.
100. Id. at 5-7; Christensen, The Danish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1100
(1961).
101. GELLHORN, at 101-103.
102. Id. at 154.
103. Alberta, New Brunswick and Quebec. Hearings, at 7.
104. Hearings, at 83.
105. HAwAn REV. STATS. §96-2.
106. Hearings, at 18.
107. Report on the Penal Ombudsman, supra note 12, at 7.
108. Id.
109. Hearings, at 77.
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san entanglements while retaining compassion for his constituents'
problems. He must be expert in analyzing questions of law and fact and
must understand the dilemmas of modem administration. Finally, he
must be tactful because overreaching would destroy confidence in
his office among public officials.
Despite these high standards, ombudsman statutes commonly impose
few prerequisites for the office. 110 Of the nine countries discussed
by Professor Gellhom in his classic work on the subject, five have
required prior legal training and a sixth has in fact appointed an at-
torney."' Two reasons have been suggested for this "emphatic prefer-
ence" for lawyers." 2  First, much of the ombudsman's work deals ei-
ther with legal issues or with extensive analysis of statutes and rulings.
Secondly, a lawyer is trained to be a generalist, a useful attitude in an
ombudsman's office.
Other prerequisites have been minimal. He normally may not be a
member of the legislature," 3 and is often forbidden to accept outside
employment."' In the Scandanavian countries, the only requirement
besides legal training is a general provision, such as "outstanding integ-
rity.""' 5 In actual practice, exceptionally competent men have been
chosen;" 6 it is rare that excessive zeal or misuse of the power to pub-
licize matters has been charged." 7 The ombudsmen in other countries
have almost invariably been chosen by the legislatures," 8 a procedure
historically regarded as necessary to assure the ombudsman's inde-
pendence." 19 Although appointed by a legislature which is controlled
by partisan interests, ombudsmen have steered remarkably clear of par-
tisan entanglements.'2 0 The term of appointment varies from country
to country, from two years to an indefinite term. The term should be
long enough to provide the security which insulates from political
pressures, yet short enough to prevent complacency in office.
How does a matter come before the ombudsman? There are
generally two ways: on complaint from an individual, or on the om-
budsman's own initiative.
110. See generally, GELLHORN, at 422, 423.
111. Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Soviet Union have required prior
legal training and New Zealand has in fact appointed an attorney. GELLHORN, at 422,
423. The Alberta Ombudsman has an attorney on his staff. Hearings, at 72.
112. GELLHORN, at 423.
113. Id. at 104; HAwAii REv. STATs. §96-2.
114. Christensen, supra note 100, at 1104.
115. Jagerskiold, supra note 97, at 1081.
116. GELLHORN, at 424.
117. Id. at 34, 436. But for criticism of the Swedish Ombudsman in this respect,
see Jagerskiold, supra note 97, at 1091.
118. E.g., Alberta, Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden and Hawaii. GELLHORN, at
424; HAWAI REV. STATS. §96-2.
119. See generally, Report on the Penal Ombudsman, supra note 12, at 13.
120. GELLHORN, at 424.
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It is generally thought that the individual must have free access to
the ombudsman's office in order to assure that all matters are brought
to his attention. 121 Thus only New Zealand imposes a filing fee, and
this has been criticized. 122  But some restrictions are generally laid
down, apparently designed to allow the ombudsman to gracefully de-
cline to act, since he may always take up a matter on his own initiative:
1) The complaint must be in writing. This restriction elimi-
nates trival and verbrose oral complaints which could consume
all the ombudsman's time. 2 3
2) The ombudsman is usually given the express discretion to re-
fuse to investigate frivolous or vexatious complaints, al-
though he must always reply.' 24
3) There is sometimes a short statute of limitations (one year)
to screen out stale complaints.' 2 5
The second major avenue for matters to reach the ombudsman is
for him to take the matter up on his own initiative. This broad
provision allows the ombudsman to waive any of the above restrictions
if he feels that justice would be served by doing so.' 26  For example,
an old claim which had merit and was still supported by the evidence
could be pursued thus circumventing any statute of limitations. 127  In
addition, it allows the ombudsman to act on matters he has read about
in the press or discovered in the course of another investigation or
inspection. 28  At least one ombudsman feels that the ability to take
up matters on his own initiative enables him to produce the socially
most significant results, especially when dealing with the prisons.' 20
Once the matter has come before the ombudsman, what action may
he take? A large percentage of complaints are either unjustified on
their face or are found -unjustified after investigation. 130 These com-
plaints require little action other than a reply.' 3 ' And even before a
121. Id. at 122-123, 427.
122. Id.
123. Concerning this writing requirement, the Alberta ombudsman has said,
This is a section which I may say I bow to the east three times every morning
in memory of the man who devised it, because without it I'd be overwhelmed.
Hearings, at 59.
124. E.g., HAWAn Rv.v. STATS. §96-6; GELLHORN at 428.
125. E.g., in Alberta. Hearings, at 58.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In 1964, the Swedish Ombudsman investigated 1239 citizen complaints, 11 on
the basis of news reports, and 179 as a result of an inspection or other information.
GELLHORN, at 208.
129. Id. at 208, 430.
130. Experience in Sweden and New Zealand reveals that about 8590-905% of
matters before the ombudsman arrive on an individual's complaint; the balance is taken
up on his own initiative. Of this 85%-909o, up to 90% may be found unjustified.
GELLHORN, at 119, 214.
131. The social utility of answering the unjustified complaint is explained infra.
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decision has been made on the merits, mere initiation of the investiga-
tion may be sufficient to achieve the desired changes. 132  Once the
matter has been investigated and found meritorious, the ombuds-
man must consult with the agency involved.' 33 He will confer ei-
ther with an official at the level where the problem occurred or he
will move up through the administrative hierarchy as he sees fit.' 3 4
In these consultations two techniques may be used by the ombuds-
man. If the action is illegal, he will simply point out the illegality.
More often, though, the action will be legal but involve an improper
exercise of discretion. Mr. George McClellan, the Alberta Ombuds-
man, has aptly described his technique in such a case
I do go forward on humanitarian grounds on many, many
cases. It works very effectively, too. I am often met with, 'Now
look, there's the law and we didn't break the law,' and they didn't
I find that by saying, 'All right now, if you and I walk outside
and we stop the first fifteen people that come along and we tell
them what happened to this man, what do you think they're going
to say about whether he's had a fair shake or not?' And inter-
estingly enough, they'd pause, and then finally smile and say, 'OK,
what is it you want?" 3 5
Almost all meritorious claims are settled at this level, often as the re-
sult of a negotiated settlement. 36
There has been some uncertainty in the statutes concerning an om-
budsman's review of matters which are legal but involve an improper
exercise of discretion. Gellhorn aptly points out the problem
Theoretically, an external critic does not criticize the exercise of
administrative discretion simply because he himself might have
done the job somewhat differently had he been in the adminis-
trator's place. Criticism is appropriate only when the discretion
is found to have been exercised for insupportable reasons. But
this difference is hard to formulate in words and even harder
to preserve in action. In some countries it is almost entirely ig-
nored.
The New Zealand Ombudsman, for example, can consider not
only whether a challenged administrative action is illegal, but also
whether it is unjust, oppressive, or, as the governing statute
bluntly says, just plain 'wrong'. . . .. In Norway, whose ombuds-
man has been told to concern himself with 'injustice,' and in
132. The Alberta Ombudsman has occasionally had an over-reaction to notifica-
tion of his impending investigation-policy will be changed before he even has a
chance to investigate the merits. Hearings, at 79.
133. E.g., Hearings, at 75-76.
134. See generally, Hearings.
135. Id. at 69.
136. Id. at 61.
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Denmark, where the ombudsman can criticize 'mistakes' and 'un-
reasonable decisions' among other things, considerable latitude ex-
ists.' 37
New Zealand's experience under a broadly worded statute has been
encouraging. In view of the lack of abuse, jurisdictions recently adopt-
ing ombudsman statutes have followed New Zealand's lead.' 8
If the administrators involved are not persuaded that they have
abused their discretion, and the ombudsman remains convinced of his
position, the matter may be taken to the legislature and the press. Be-
cause the power to publicize is one of the ombudsman's most impor-
tant sanctions it should not be abused.
If the critic constantly depicts himself as a St. George slaying
dragon after dragon, officials who do not relish being regarded
as dragons may themselves become just a bit critical. An ex-
ternal critic needs the admiration and support of administrative
personnel as well as newspapermen. 189
Fortunately, the power to publicize has not been abused in practice.' 40
As could be expected, opposition to ombudsman proposals in other
countries has centered around a fear of the misuse of this power.' 4'
However, experience has changed administrators, who originally op-
posed the ombudsman concept, into its warmest supporters. Gellhorn
quotes one New Zealand official as recalling
My Department was strongly against the whole idea. We re-
garded it as just a political maneuver, and as a matter of fact, we
may have been right at the time. But now, after nearly three
years of experience, we are just as strongly in favor as when we
were opposed. The Ombudsman has proved to be a good thing
for the citizen-and for the Department too.142
The ombudsman's power to publicize his findings can actually benefit
public officials. One implication of the fact that up to ninety percent
of complaints are found to be unjustified is often overlooked. The
officials involved in those cases have received the satisfaction of being
upheld by an impartial judge, and they have been protected against
ill-founded or malicious charges.' 43
137. GBLLHORN, at 433-434.
138. Alberta and Hawaii. Hearings, at 56; HAwA REv. STATS. §96-8.
139. GELLHORN, at 438.
140. See generally, GELLHORN, at 91-93.
141. E.g., New Zealand. Id.
142. Id. at 91. Other examples are also cited.
143. This protection was sorely needed after the George Jackson killing, whenguards were accused of killing him in cold blood and then beating other prisoners.
See San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 27, 1971 at 1, cols. 5 and 6.
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Functions of the Ombudsman
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the ombudsman serves im-
portant functions in a political system. First, he increases administra-
tive efficiency by assisting the individual who does not know where
to turn. Whatever the citizen's complaint, an ombudsman can help
by directing the complainant to the proper agency, by requesting a re-
view of the case if it is meritorious or simply by explaining to the citi-
zen why a particular action was taken. In so doing, the ombudsman
acts as a safety valve; the citizen who has a complaint which re-
mains unsatisfied for whatever reason is an unhappy citizen.
At the same time, the ombudsman gives valuable "feedback" to the
institution involved. Every political system needs a means of assessing
the results of actions it has taken so that it can assure fulfillment of
its goals. 144  Regular complaints in a certain area may indicate a
need for a particular change. The fresh, independent view of an om-
budsman may provide just such a means of assessing actions taken.145
Thus the ombudsman is a "fail-safe device;""' one which supple-
ments existing complaint procedures only when they fail. He acts ef-
fectively to improve the internal complaint procedure-no official likes
to have an outsider point out his failings. 147
Finally, the ombudsman can provide a means of structural reform.
Because no system is perfect, the ombudsman will inevitably investi-
gate matters in which any agency has acted legally and within its
discretion, but where the law or the law's policy is arbitrary or un-
fair. In such a case the ombudsman cannot himself institute the de-
sired changes, but he can document the need for a change by keeping
records. Then, when the legislature decides to review the situation, it
has at hand an accumulation of detailed information which clarifies
the issues.
The Prison Ombudsman
A prison ombudsman can provide a central source of information
for the prisoner. He would be able to investigate quickly and in-
formally. Because he would be independent of the correctional sys-
tem, he would presumably have the trust of the inmates.
A penal ombudsman could provide important services to the cor-
rectional system. First, it could be argued that he would aid in the re-
144. K. DErTSCH, THE NERVEs OF GOVERNMENT 185-199 (1966).
145. GELLHORN, at 144-150.
146. Hearings, at 16.
147. GELLHORN, at 437.
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habilitative process by demonstrating society's concern for the inmate.
In assuring the inmate that he will be treated according to the prin-
ciples of fair play, the argument runs, he would be encouraged to him-
self act according to those principles. Secondly, the ombudsman
could help to reduce the isolation of the correctional system from the
public view. Several recent prison riots were characterized by demon-
strations designed to bring public attention to the prisoners' situa-
tion.148 Some persons associated with prisons feel that the ombuds-
man could help reduce the tensions which lead to this type of riot. 4
And finally, the ombudsman would help to protect the administra-
tors of the correctional system from unfounded charges. The ad-
ministrators will be found to be justified in their action in as many cases
as the ombudsman finds the complaints unjustified. Since unjustified
complaints may run as high as ninety percent, 1 0 officials will be vin-
dicated most of the time.
Although other jurisdictions have military-penal ombudsmen,' 5'
and most ombudsmen include prisons within their general jurisdic-
tion,152 the idea of an ombudsman solely for a prison system is unique
to California. Proposals have been made to appoint resident counsel
for prisoners,'5 3 to appoint a permanent independent commission to
investigate prisoner complaints 15 4 and to create a statewide public de-
fender to handle appeals. 55  But this is the first legislative proposal
for an ombudsman specifically for the penal system.
The proposal originated in the Assembly Interim Committee on
Criminal Procedure in 1970. After extensive research, hearings were
held on December 14 and 15, 1970.56 These hearings resulted
in the introduction of Assembly Bill 1181 on March 25, 1971. The
bill was authored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy.
The only opposition to the proposal at the hearings came from
California Youth Authority, who felt there was no demonstrated need
for an ombudsman as applied to their department. 5 7  The Depart-
ment of Corrections was at first skeptical of the proposal, feeling that
an ombudsman would interfere with the chain of command within the
Department, but later gave tentative approval, upon condition that the
148. E.g., The Tombs Riot. See note 177 infra.
149. Hearings, at 23, 29.
150. Hearings, at 6; GELLHORN, at 91-93.
151. GELLHORN, at 154.
152. E.g., Alberta. Hearings, at 65.
153. Comment, supra note 57.
154. Note, supra note 37.
155. S.B. 24, 1971 Regular Session.
156. Hearings.
157. Hearings, at 46-52.
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impartiality of the ombudsman be safeguarded-that he not become
an advocate for the inmates.'""
Assembly Bill 1181 would have added Chapter Six, entitled "Cor-
rectional Ombudsman," to Part 2, Division 2, Title 2 of the Govern-
ment Code, covering Sections 10700 to 10724 of that Code.'5 9 The
bill was generally based on the Hawaiian statute.160
Section 10709 would have given the ombudsman jurisdiction over
administrative acts of the agencies listed in section 10700. These
agencies include the Adult Authority, the Board of Corrections, the
Department of Corrections, the Department of Youth Authority, the
Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority, the Women's Board of Terms
and Paroles, and the Youth Authority Board. "Administrative act"
was defined as "any action, omission, decision, recommendation, prac-
tice, or other procedure of an agency."
The only significant state-wide correctional agency left out of the
list was the Correctional Industries Commission. This Commission
acts only in an advisory capacity concerning competition between cor-
rectional and private industries and has no authority over matters di-
rectly affecting inmates.16  In addition, the entire system of city and
county jails was omitted. These institutions probably should have
been included within the ombudsman's jurisdiction, since inmates of
jails suffer the same isolation from the community as state prisoners
and, in fact, jails house many who have not yet been convicted and
are arguably more in need of protection. But political considera-
tions precluded consideration of these institutions at the time for fear
of "treading on some sacred cows and the jurisdiction of supervisors
and sheriffs.'1 62  Otherwise the ombudsman's jurisdiction appeared to
cover all correctional agencies which might affect the inmate's life.
Sections 10710 and 10711 would have given jurisdiction over "ap-
propriate subjects." These might have included administrative acts
which are "contrary to law" (section 10711(a)). The ombudsman
clearly needs authority to investigate illegal administrative acts.
He would have also been allowed to investigate discretionary de-
cisions of prison officials, 16 3 including acts which are "unreason-
158. Id. at 33-46; Guthrie.
159. A.B. 1181, 1971 Regular Session. A.B. 1181 was vetoed by the Governor.
160. HAwAI REv. STATS. §§96-1 to 96-19.
161. CAL. PEN. CODE §§5085-5094.
162. Hearings, at 160.
163. In a recent examination of California's prison system Jessica Mitford force-
fully argues for "an essential first step penetrating the closed doors behind which the
authorities, from prison administrator to parole board, operate." Mitford, supra note
1 at 52. To deny the ombudsman the authority to investigate discretionary decisions
would eliminate the ombudsman's function as a reform mechanism. Impartial, docu-
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able, unfair, oppressive, or unnecessarily discriminatory, even though
in accordance with law" (section 10711(b)) and those "based on
improper or irrelevant grounds" (section 10711(d)). Arguably, this
last phrase would include the wording of section 10711 (c) ("based
on a mistake of fact"), making section 10711 (c) unnecessary. How-
ever, both phrases are found in the Hawaiian statute, after which A.B.
1181 was patterned.1 4
The remaining two subsections would have added very little to the
statute and may have presented problems. Section 10711(e) would
have allowed the ombudsman to investigate an administrative act
"unaccompanied by an adequate statement of reasons." Does this imply
that all administrative acts should be accompanied by a statement of
reasons? Such a burden on administrators would clearly be intolerable.
If there is no such implication, is there a reverse implication that if
an "adequate statement of reasons" is given the ombudsman is pre-
cluded from further action? It may be better to allow the ombudsman
to proceed as he sees fit, regardless of any "statement of reasons."
Section 10711(f) allowed investigation of acts "performed in an
inefficient manner." This would appear to infringe on the area of pure
administration, where the responsibility for investigation and evalua-
tion properly lies with the administrator. However, both this section
and section 10711(g) ("otherwise erroneous") parallel the Hawaiian
statute. And the "otherwise erroneous" provision is the same as in
Alberta and New Zealand where no problems have developed.'
Section 10702 would have established a joint committee to nomi-
nate the ombudsman, who would then be elected by joint resolution of
the legislature. This procedure is similar to that estabilished in Swe-
den, where it seems to have worked well. 166 Section 10703 would
have provided a four year term of office, which seems long enough
to provide the necessary independence through security in office. The
same section would have allowed resignation and a method of filling
vacancies in addition to providing a method of removal from office by
concurrent resolution of the legislature in case of "disability, neglect
of office or misconduct." None of these standards seems to pose a
threat to the ombudsman's independence.
Section 10704(c) would have required that persons "schooled and
experienced" in the areas of law, investigative technique and criminol-
mented evidence of just where the weak points are and where due process should be
insisted upon would not be provided by the ombudsman. Legislators would be forced
to rely on their own haphazard information in considering future reform.
164. HAwAn REV. STATS. §96-8.
165. See notes 137 and 138 supra.
166. GELLHORN at 424.
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ogy and corrections be represented among the ombudsman and his
staff. Obviously the ombudsman or someone on his staff must know
how to investigate, but why codify the requirement? Did this lan-
guage mean that a person schooled in the investigative techniques of
journalism who lacks formal training in investigation must be preferred
over the experienced police officer? The same objections may be
made to the requirement for expertise in criminology and corrections.
Did this mean a professor of criminology, or an administrator ex-
perienced in California corrections? Would a legislative committee
tend to attempt to combine all these areas in one man, thus passing
over otherwise highly qualified men? In view of the lack of prior qual-
ifications characteristic of other ombudsman statutes, 167 the provisions
appear -unwise and unnecessarily restrictive.
Restrictions against holding office as a member of the legislature
or other outside employment were provided in the bill.'68 In addi-
tion, the ombudsman and his subordinates would have been forbidden
to hold membership in a government employees association, and to
engage in "unnecessary contacts" with persons against whom com-
plaints may be made. The former provision is designed to avoid po-
tential conflicts of interest in disputes where an administrative employee
might be represented by the California State Employees Association,
and is probably necessary. The latter provision ("unnecessary con-
tacts") is also apparently designed as a safeguard to the ombuds-
man's independence, but this provision seems unduly vague. What are
"unnecessary contacts?" Are after hour cocktail parties or random con-
versations with guards included? It would seem that either could be
sources for obtaining information about potential problems requiring
investigation. Would such "contacts" have constituted "misconduct"
under section 10703 and be the basis for political charges designed
to remove the ombudsman from office? More precise language should
be used in any future legislation.
The ombudsman would have been allowed, by section 10708, to es-
tablish formal procedures necessary to fulfill his duties, but no fees
could have been levied. Section 10712 proposed discretionary restric-
tions on the flow of complaints to the ombudsman. He would not have
been required to investigate if there was an adequate existing remedy,
if the complaint concerned policy determined by law, if the com-
plaint was frivolous or vexatious, or if the complainant had had
knowledge of the matter for one year without acting on it. The only re-
167. Id. at 422-424.
168. A.B. 1181, 1971 Regular Session, proposed sections 10705 and 10706(a)-(b).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 3
striction left out, occasionally seen in other ombudsman statutes, was
the requirement of a sufficient personal interest in the outcome of
the matter.1 9 This omission was appropriate, since in a prison en-
vironment the individual affected may not speak out for fear of jeopar-
dizing his chances of parole, while a concerned friend or official not
directly concerned in the outcome may do so on the inmate's behalf.
Sections 10713 and 10719 would have required the ombudsman to
notify the complainant whether action was taken on his complaint and
what the action was. This is necessary so the prisoners would know
their complaints were being acted on. Section 10721 would have re-
quired correspondence between the ombudsman and a complainant to
be confidential-the correspondence is not to be inspected or opened.
This is necessary to assure that prisoners do not fail to write the om-
budsman for fear of retaliation. In addition, Penal Code Section 2600
would have been amended. This statute currently allows an inmate to
correspond confidentially with any member of the State Bar or holder
of public office, but the prison authorities may open and inspect such
correspondence to search for contraband. Penal Code Section 2600
as it would have been amended by AB 1181 included correspondence
with the ombudsman, and would have prohibited the opening or in-
spection of such correspondence under any conditions. 70
Section 10714 would have allowed the ombudsman to "make in-
quiries and obtain information as he thinks fit . . . inspect the
premises of an agency and hold hearings." He would have been given
the powers of a head of a department.17' If he found that reconsidera-
tion of an administrative act should be made, he would have been re-
quired to report his recommendation to the agency involved. 7 2 Ie
was authorized to require a notification within a specified time of any
action taken.' 73  He would have been allowed to present his recom-
mendations to the Governor, the Legislature and the public within a rea-
sonable time after notifying the agency involved, 74 and would have
been required to report to the Legislature annually.17  He would have
been required to maintain secrecy on all matters and identities "ex-
cept so far as disclosure may be necessary to enable him to carry out his
duties and to support his recommendations. 17 6
169. Hearings at 58.
170. Currently such mail may be opened to inspect for contraband. CAL.. PEN.
CODE §2600(4)(i). This amendment to §2600 was deleted in the final amended ver-
sion of the bill.
171. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§11180-11191 giving full powers of subpoena.
172. A.B. 1181, 1971 Regular Session, proposed section 10717.
173. id.
174. A.B. 1181, 1971 Regular Session, proposed section 10718.
175. A.B. 1181, 1971 Regular Session, proposed section 10722.
176. A.B. 1181, 1971 Regular Session, proposed section 10714(b).
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Section 10720 would have required the ombudsman to report any
misconduct or breach of duty to the authority having jurisdiction over
the violator. This seems to go a step further than necessary; in addi-
tion to duties of investigation he is given a duty to report on "mis-
conduct," even though the breach may be minor, the results recti-
fied and the official repentant. Such a duty could discourage officials
from full cooperation, and should be omitted in future proposals. Sec-
tion 10723 would have assured that the ombudsman provisions are in
addition to all other remedies, and should not be construed to limit
any other remedies.
CONCLUSION
The recent disturbances in the California correctional system make
it clear that prisoners have complaints which they feel are not being
properly considered.
An ombudsman would offer prisoners a chance to state their com-
plaints without fear of reprisal; and prisoners may feel that "someone"
is listening. This may alleviate the prisoner's frustrations and as an
added benefit reduce the number of complaints to the courts. At the
very least, the ombudsman would provide reliable information indi-
cating exactly which further reforms should be instituted.
It should be remembered that the ombudsman is not a panacea.
He cannot himself reform the system or make problems disappear. But
he is an outlet for inmates to vent their grievances while offering
hope of rectification. At the same time, he can provide an independ-
ent view of prison disputes, aiding prisoners with their legitimate com-
plaints and protecting prison officials against unfounded charges. Per-
haps most importantly, the ombudsman may alleviate the problem of
frivolous petitions. For these reasons the ombudsman is a practical
first step toward penal reform.
A prison can explode at any time, even when the legitimacy of
the grievances is nowhere near as clear as it was for the rioting
prisoners last year. When men face long-term imprisonment they
can become desperate and in their desperation they can provoke
riots that have no other cause. 177
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